Credit: Kevin Lamarque/Reuters via Gallo Images
By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jun 16 2025 – At a White House meeting, presidents Nayib Bukele and Donald Trump exchanged praises and joked about mass incarceration while discussing an unprecedented agreement: the USA would pay El Salvador US$6 million a year to house deportees – of any nationality, potentially including US citizens – in its Centre for Terrorism Confinement (CECOT), a notorious mega-prison. This agreement marked the evolution of Bukele’s authoritarian model from a domestic experiment to an exportable commodity for strongmen worldwide.
Shortly after Trump’s inauguration, Bukele had tweeted an offer to help the US outsource its incarceration system. Less than six weeks later, hundreds of Venezuelan deportees were sent to CECOT under the 1798Alien Enemies Act. Among them was Kilmar Abrego García, a Salvadoran man who’d lived in Maryland for 15 years and was deported despite being granted protections by a US immigration judge. When the US Supreme Court ordered the Trump administration to facilitate his return, Bukele refused on the grounds that he wouldn’t ‘smuggle a terrorist into the United States’. For Trump, this was one of the perks of having an ally who disregards the rule of law as much as he does.
Bukele’s path to authoritarianism
Bukele’s systematic assault on democracy began after his 2019 election victory, when he broke from El Salvador’s traditional two-party system and secured 53.4 per cent of the vote. The first significant sign of his willingness to ignore democratic norms came when the opposition-controlled Legislative Assembly refused to approve a multi-million-dollar loan for his security and anti-gang programme. Bukele called on supporters, police and the army to pressure legislators.
In the 2021 legislative election his party won a supermajority, enabling him to pass any laws and dismiss the judges who’d declared policies unconstitutional, appointing compliant replacements who gave him the green light to run for an unconstitutional second term.
The cornerstone of Bukele’s authoritarian project was his March 2022 declaration of a state of emergency following a spike in gang killings. Initially presented as temporary, the state of emergency has been repeatedly renewed and expanded into a new normal where constitutional rights, including due process, legal defence and freedom of assembly, no longer exist.
Bukele’s security policy involves massive deployment of security forces to ‘extract’ suspected gang members and jail them for life in extremely overcrowded conditions with no visits or rehabilitation programmes. This approach has led to the warrantless detention of over 80,000 people, giving El Salvador the world’s highest incarceration rate. Visible gang activity has dramatically fallen and the homicide rate plummeted from 105 per 100,000 people in 2015 to 1.9 in 2024, earning Bukele high approval ratings and re-election with 85 per cent of the vote. But the human rights cost has been devastating.
Since his unconstitutional re-election, Bukele has accelerated his institutional dismantling. On 29 January, the Legislative Assembly ratified a constitutional amendment eliminating the previous requirement that constitutional amendments be ratified by two successive legislatures. Bukele can now change the constitution without proper consultation and debate. Safeguards protecting key constitutional norms, including those prohibiting presidential re-election, have been removed.
Constitutional manipulation has been accompanied by judicial capture. In September 2024, the Legislative Assembly elected seven new Supreme Court judges, despite civil society criticism of the lack of procedural transparency and concerns about the candidates’ lack of independence.
Civic space under assault
The deterioration of civic space has been equally systematic, with the state intensifying its criminalisation of activists. In March 2024, Verónica Delgado was arbitrarily detained and charged with ‘unlawful association’ for her work as a member of the Search Block group, which searches for relatives who’ve disappeared under the state of emergency. In February 2025, at least 21 activists and civil society leaders were arbitrarily detained in coordinated operations. Among them was Fidel Zavala, spokesperson for the human rights organisation Unit for the Defence of Human and Community Rights, who’d recently filed a complaint against prison authorities citing cases of torture.
Bukele’s assault on press freedom has reached unprecedented levels. The Association of Journalists of El Salvador recorded 466 cases of attacks against journalists in 2024. Bukele has directly targeted independent media, using his Twitter/X account to discredit El Faro, a digital news outlet that investigated COVID-19 procurement contracts. Physical intimidation has escalated, with police raiding journalist Mónica Rodríguez’s home in December 2024, seizing hard drives and USB devices without a search warrant or any legal explanation.
State surveillance has become systematic and brazen. In November 2024, the Legislative Assembly adopted two laws on cybersecurity and data protection that grant authorities broad powers to remove online content and demand deletion of material deemed ‘inaccurate’, paving the way for systematic censorship.
The latest civic space attack is a Russian-inspired Foreign Agents Law passed in May, requiring anyone receiving foreign funding to register with a Registry of Foreign Agents. It imposes a punitive 30 per cent tax on all foreign payments and grants the authorities sweeping powers to approve, deny or revoke registrations. This is a devastating blow because most Salvadoran organisations depend on foreign donations and many have been critical of Bukele’s human rights violations, making them vulnerable to being labelled political threats.
Authoritarianism for export
Bukele’s model has attracted admirers worldwide. His re-election was hailed by many who seek to emulate him, and he receives sky-high approval ratings in other countries in the region, particularly those enduring rising crime.
The Trump-Bukele deportation agreement is the most visible manifestation of authoritarian collaboration, but the partnership extends beyond immigration policy. Trump has expressed admiration for Bukele’s methods, recently announcing plans to rebuild and reopen Alcatraz Island, arguing the notorious prison would help circumvent judges that fail to do his bidding. Bukele has encouraged Trump’s defiance of judges, calling legal challenges to Trump’s policies ‘a judicial coup’ and urging Republicans to remove what he calls ‘corrupt judges’. Trump must find Bukele’s systematic dismantling of civil society inspiring, viewing his criminalisation of activists and silencing of independent media as effective tools for consolidating power.
The international community’s response has been muted, reflecting the dilemma posed by Bukele’s genuine popularity and security achievements. The enthusiasm with which international observers have embraced what they see as Bukele’s success story demonstrates the dangerous appeal of authoritarian responses to complex social problems. His ability to achieve genuine, if not necessarily long-lasting, security improvements while systematically dismantling democratic institutions offers a seductive blueprint for other leaders frustrated by the constraints of democratic governance.
Bukele’s transformation of El Salvador from a fragile democracy into an authoritarian state is one of the most dramatic examples of democratic backsliding in contemporary Latin America, serving as a warning about the fragility of democratic institutions and an indication of how authoritarianism can adapt and spread. When Salvadorans eventually seek alternatives to Bukele’s increasingly repressive rule, they’ll face the struggle of having to repair the democratic machinery necessary for peaceful political change.
Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.
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